Based on one decade of impactful security research and several years as a risk manager, Karsten Nohl reflects upon what he would have done differently in pushing a data security agenda.

Our community is convinced that stellar IT security is paramount for companies large and small: We need security for system availability, for brand reputation, to prevent fraud, and to keep data private. But is more security always better?

Poorly chosen protection measures can have large externalities on the productivity, innovation capacity, and even happiness of organizations. Can too much security be worse than too little security?

This talk investigates the trade-off between security and innovation along several examples of current security research. It finds that some hacking research is counter-productive in bringing the most security to most people, by spreading fear too widely.

DVB-T is a standard for digital television broadcasting. The standard requires a consumer who wants to watch the digital television broadcasts to purchase a special device that can receive and process the RF signals.
In my research I wanted to be able to exploit a DVBT receiver via an over the air attack – sending a specially crafted data packet over an RF signal and taking over the device.
The research was focused on a common receiver in Israel and Europe made by a Chinese company called MSTAR. In the talk I will cover the research steps from the firmware extraction from the flash chip to the development of an ad-hoc debugger and finally the exploitation of the device.

This talk will show esoteric web application vulnerabilities in detail, these vulnerabilities would be missed in a quick review by most security consultants, but could lead to remote code execution, authentication bypass and purchasing items in merchants using Paypal as their payment gateway without actually paying. SQL injections are dead, and I don’t care: let's explore the world of null, nil and NULL; noSQL injections; host header injections that lead to phone call audio interception; paypal’s double spent and Rails’ MessageVerifier remote code execution.

Hard Disk Drives (HDD) have a hidden space for storing data. If malicious software is stored in this hidden area, it could lead to attacking computers even if they are air-gapped.
By abusing surplus space of HDD, such cyber attack against off-line industrial control systems could become possible.
Moreover, the software or any data in this hidden space can survive against formatting, OS reinstallation, malware destruction software and any conventional cybersecurity framework.

Let us call it "PARADAIS"

While the PARADAIS stays unactivated, LBAs are not mapped to the hidden data area. Therefore, even if the HDD is wiped several times such as 3-pass, 7-pass or 35-pass, it remains there as it is.
There has been no way to detect or erase the unidentified software at PARADAIS in advance when the HDD had been modified prior to your purchase or its installation. However, new solutions are being discovered by my ongoing research.
Who can predict that Windows OS may boot after the HDD is wiped by Enhanced Secure Erase ? It would be you at CODEBLUE2016.
The 2nd part of my presentation would be on DATA RECOVERY from HDD the platter surface of which has been damaged because of head crash, natural disaster or intentional destruction at crime scenes. Survey results of 12 cases show how effective the disk surface cleaning by DDRH was.

The very best attackers often use PowerShell to hide their scripts from A/V and application whitelisting technologies using encoded commands and memory-only payloads to evade detection. These techniques thwart Blue Teams from determining what was executed on a target system. However, defenders are catching on, and state-of-the-art detection tools now monitor the command line arguments for powershell.exe either in real-time or from event logs.
We need new avenues to remain stealthy in a target environment. So, this talk will highlight a dozen never-before-seen techniques for obfuscating PowerShell command line arguments. As an incident responder at Mandiant, I have seen attackers use a handful of these methods to evade basic command line detection mechanisms. I will share these techniques already being used in the wild so you can understand the value each technique provides the attacker.
Updated PowerShell event logging mitigates many of the detection challenges that obfuscation introduces. However, many organizations do not enable this PowerShell logging. Therefore, I will provide techniques that the Blue Team can use to detect the presence of these obfuscation methods in command line arguments. I will conclude this talk by highlighting the public release of Invoke-Obfuscation. This tool applies the aforementioned obfuscation techniques to user-provided commands and scripts to evade command line argument detection mechanisms.

For quite some time we have been seeing espionage cases reaching countries, governments and large companies.
A large number of backdoors were found on network devices, mobile phones and other related devices, having as main cases the ones that were reported by the media, such as: TP-Link, Dlink, Linksys, Samsung and other companies which are internationally renowned.
This talk will discuss a backdoor found on the modem / router rtn, equipment that has a big question mark on top of it, because there isn’t a vendor identification and no information about who’s its manufacturer and there are at least 7 companies linked to its production, sales and distribution in the market. Moreover, some of them never really existed.<

Smartphones are commonly used as the controller and Internet gateway for BLE-enabled IoT devices. Designing a strong authentication protocol between them is the key part of IoT security. However mobile app design has many challenges such as limited input & output interfaces as well as user privacy protection features. Due to these restrictions, many vendors has given-up BLE's build-in security manager protocol and choose to build their own authentication protocols.
This study focused on a generalized method to analyze these BLE authentication protocols, discovering and solving challenges mentioned above. We applied this method on commercial products, including popular Gogoro Smart Scooter from Taiwan. We will demo under some certain circumstances it is possible to dump key used to unlock your Gogoro Scooter and send fake BLE authentication protocol packets to steal the scooter.

On June, thousands of Facebook users complained that they had been infected by a virus through their accounts after they received a message from a Facebook friend claiming they had mentioned them in a comment. Kaspersky Lab researcher Ido Naor and Dani Goland, CEO & founder of Undot, decided to investigate. They quickly discovered that the message had in fact been initiated by attackers and unleashed a two-stage attack on recipients. The first stage of the attack started when the user clicked on the “mention”. A malicious file seized control of their browsers, terminating its legitimate session and replacing it with a malicious one that captured their entire web traffic. The second stage included a highly sophisticated script that took over victims Facebook and Google Drive accounts. After puzzling the script, they managed to extract the proverbial needle from a haystack: an unknown Facebook vulnerability that allowed an attacker to exploit the notifications functionality.
In this talk, Dani and Ido will dive into the bites and bytes of the campaign and explaining how the attackers exploited Facebook to spread the malware.

End-user’s requirements for secure IT products are continually increased in environment that are affected directly to human life and industry such as IoT, CPS. Because vendors and end-user sell or buy products based on trustworthy or objective security evaluation results, security evaluation roles are important. Security Evaluations are divided to two parts, one is evaluation on design level such as ISO/IEC 29128(Verification of Cryptographic Protocols) and another one is post-implementation level such as ISO/IEC 15408(Common Criteria). These security evaluation standards, both ISO/IEC 29128 and ISO/IEC 15408, advise to use formal verification and automated tools when high assurance level of target products is required.
For a long time, vulnerability detection using automated tools have been tried and studied by many security researchers and hackers. And recently, the study related to automated vulnerability detection are now more active than ever in hacking community with DARPA’s CGC(Cyber Grand Challenge). But, too many tools are developed continually and usually each tool has their own purpose to use, so it’s hard to achieve ultimate goal of security evaluation effectively and verify evaluation results.
Furthermore, there are no references for categorizing about automated tools on perspective of security evaluations. So, in this presentation we will list up, categorize and analyze all of automated tools for vulnerability detection and introduce our result such as pros and cons, purpose, effectiveness, etc.

Building a distributed scanner can be challenging, building one using real browsers even more so.
Injecting JavaScript to extract JS libraries and their versions, storing all HTML and JavaScript along with security headers requires a unique architecture. Having scanned the top 1,000,000 sites, I will cover the challenges I overcame in designing a scalable system to fingerprint the current state of the web. I will also present some of the more interesting findings of the data that was analyzed.

In Japan, information security engineers are lacking. So, I am focused on artificial intelligence (AI) technology to solve the lack of human resources. And, I have developed the AI to detect vulnerabilities on web apps called SAIVS (Spider Artificial Intelligence Vulnerabilities Scanner). The goal of SAIVS is to obtain ability of equal or higher than vulnerability diagnosis members. Currently, SAIVS is prototype.
But, it is possible to detect vulnerabilities on web apps like a human.

1. It can crawl web apps.
SAIVS can crawl web apps that include dynamic pages such as "login," "create account".
For example, SAIVS recognizes the type of the page. If it crawls the login page without having a login credential, it creates login credential in the create account page. After it login with the created login credentials, it crawls the rest of the pages.

2. It can detect vulnerabilities.
SAIVS can detect vulnerabilities efficiently by observing the behavior of web apps.
For example, in the case of a reflected XSS, SAIVS recognizes the echoed back place of input value, and it can insert the exploitable tags and scripts that to match the HTML and JavaScript syntax. In addition, if the input value has been sanitized, SAIVS selects test pattern to avoid the sanitization, and it can inspect the XSS again.

I achieve these actions by simulate the thinking pattern of vulnerability diagnosis members using multiple machine learning algorithms.

My presentation will explain how this ability was made possible by the machine learning algorithms and show a demo (detecting reflected XSS).

The state of VPN protocols is not pretty, with popular options, such as IPsec and OpenVPN, being overwhelmingly complex, with large attack surfaces, using mostly cryptographic designs from the 90s. WireGuard presents a new abuse-resistant and high-performance alternative based on modern cryptography, with a focus on implementation and usability simplicity. It uses a 1-RTT handshake, based on NoiseIK, to provide perfect forward secrecy, identity hiding, and resistance to key-compromise impersonation attacks, among other important security properties, as well as high performance transport using ChaCha20Poly1305. A novel IP-binding cookie MAC mechanism is used to prevent against several forms of common denial-of-service attacks, both against the client and server, improving greatly on those of DTLS and IKEv2. Key distribution is handled out-of-band with extremely short Curve25519 points, which can be passed around in the likes of OpenSSH. Discarding the academic layering perfection of IPsec, WireGuard introduces the idea of a "cryptokey routing table", alongside an extremely simple and fully defined timer-state mechanism, to allow for easy and minimal configuration; WireGuard is actually securely deployable in practical settings. In order to rival the performance of IPsec, WireGuard is implemented inside the Linux kernel, but unlike IPsec, it is implemented in less than 4,000 lines of code, making the implementation manageably auditable. The talk will examine both the cryptography and kernel implementation particulars of WireGuard and explore an offensive attack perspective on network tunnels.

iOS was the first to introduce Kernel Patch Protection (KPP) as a method meant to mitigate tampering with kernel code. Samsung followed suit with TIMA/KRP. Both of these, however, remain undocumented to this day.
With Apple's recent relaxing of the iOS encryption, a rare first glance has been provided into the workings of KPP. At last, it can be compared and contrasted with Samsung's implementation.
This talk will present the theoretical aspects (TrustZone, ARM ELx and secure monitor), and then discuss the two implementations - Apple and Samsung - side by side. Full examples with decompilation (using author's free tools) will be provided.

Financial damages caused by remittance fraud in Japan has been increasing since year 2013, and this has become a critical problem in our society.
In April 2015, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department conducted its very first unique takedown operation called "Operation Banking Malware Takedown”.
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department had asked us to cooporate with this operation, so we developed a technology that would takedown the banking malware called "VAWTRAK".
In this presentation, I will give an overview of the operation and a background of our involvement.
Then, I will introduce and demonstrate the technology that we developed to takedown “VAWTRAK”.
I will also provide a description of ongoing banking malware attacks this year based on our investigation.

BLACKGEAR is a cyber-espionage campaign which has been targeting users in Taiwan for many years. First discovered by researchers in 2012, since then it has been the subject of multiple papers by various researchers.

BLACKGEAR has been known to take advantage of online blog services. The second-stage command-and-control (C&C) configuration information is saved within articles posted on these sites. If the threat actor wants to change the second-stage C&C, he can easily do so by modifying the content of these articles.

Like most other campaigns has evolved over time. It has recently started targeting users in Japan with similar tactics. Japanese blogging services are being used for saving encrypted configuration of second-stage C&C servers as well. In this presentation, we discuss the new tools we found used in this attack, their components, the C&C communications method use, and the roles of what we found in the overall attack picture.

OSX security vulnerability study is gaining more and more popular recently because Mac devices become more and more popular. OSX IOKit exposes large attacking surface for hackers compromising kernel extension and kernel itself from user mode. Many researcher do research on this domain (see Reference section). We will share some research results about this domain.
1. One passive fuzzing framework with context enlightenment to hunt kernel vulnerability.
2. Exploit tricks for how to occupy kernel memory from user mode program to bypass SMAP&SMEP.
3. Utilizing the vulnerabilities which found by our fuzzing method and the new exploit trick to root OSX successfully 2 times.
We introduce a new method ｡ｰPassive Fuzzing And Context Enlightenment for OSX IOKit｡ｱ which names PFACE.PFACE has following highlight points. Firstly it can meet the condition dependency and permit code execution deeper and wider to hit more codes and get more system crash. And secondly it can output the modules which contains ｡ｰContexts｡ｱ which is indicator for suspicious vulnerability. These indicators will lead reviewer to review these modules firstly.
If you have a bunch of kernel vulnerabilities, the big problem is how to transfer your ROP gadgets to the kernel space from user mode program because recent OSX already enable SMAP and SMEP. The famous security researcher Stefan Esser proposed that OSData be a good structure to occupy kernel memory [Refenece section 5]. Yes, OSData is a good data structure. But in practice, there are some problems causing OSData not to work. We find a new method that let OSData does work for occupy kernel memory from user mode program. We use the method to exploit the vulnerabilities we found and root OSX (10.11.3) successfully.
In practice, we find tens of vulnerabilities with CVE number, and many kernel crashes which fuzzing effect has been approved. And also we construct two different Local Privilege Escalation exploit to root by using some vulnerabilities of them on Mac OSX (10.11.3 ).
Here below is the CVE and ZDI list until now(NOT including submitted but pending):CVE-2015-3787, CVE-2015-5867, CVE-2015-7021,CVE-2015-7020, CVE-2016-1716,ZDI-CAN-3536,ZDI-CAN-3558, ZDI-CAN-3598,ZDI-CAN-3596,ZDI-CAN-3603,CVE-2015-7067, CVE-2015-7076,CVE-2015-7106,CVE-2015-7109,CVE-2016-1718,CVE-2016-1747,CVE-2016-1749,CVE-2016-1753, ZDI-CAN-3693, ZDI-CAN-3694, CVE-2016-1795, CVE-2016-1808, CVE-2016-1810, CVE-2016-1817, CVE-2016-1820, CVE-2016-1798, CVE-2016-1799, CVE-2016-1812, CVE-2016-1814, CVE-2016-1818, CVE-2016-1816

Air-gapped networks are isolated, separated both logically and physically from public networks. For example, military, industrial, and financial networks. Although the feasibility of invading such systems has been demonstrated in recent years, communication of data to/from air-gapped networks is a challenging task to attackers to perpetrate, an even more difficult threat to defend against.
New methods of communicating with air gapped networks are currently being exposed, some advanced and difficult to mitigate. These new found vulnerabilities have wide reaching implications on what we considered to be a foolproof solution to network security –the placement of a physical air gap.
But it doesn’t stop there – new techniques of covertly getting information in and out of air gapped networks are being exposed. Thus it is important not only to publicize these vectors of attack, but their countermeasures and feasibility as well.
In this talk, we will outline the steps an attacker must take in order to bridge an air gapped network. We will review the state-of-the-art techniques over thermal, radio, and acoustic channels, and discuss each one’s countermeasures and feasibility. Most of techniques in this talk were discovered in our labs by researcher Mordichai Guri under the supervision of Prof. Yuval Elovici.

Recently, services that provide remote control and acquire vehicle location information (GPS) is increasing. (As far as we know, it has been especially popular in the EV cars.)
These services are the challenging business for the automotive industry and OEMs because these have a potentially huge market or an additional value to their products in the future.
On the other hands, these services may lead to new threats and risks for the automobiles. This is because the Internet connection did not consider it was not necessary for automobiles so far.
Further, some researchers have already reported vulnerabilities in the remote services that are provided by various OEMs.

These issues are all reported in a foreign territory. Then, how about in Japan?
Therefore, we analyze the client apps for Japan provided by the various OEMs. But we also targeted analyzing apps for the US because apps for Japan is not many yet.
Specifically, we analyzed vulnerabilities (cooperation between apps, certificate verification, etc...) and whether these apps are using anti-analysis techniques such as obfuscation.

In this talk, we'll introduce about a potential for abusing of remote service apps in the future and countermeasures for these risks.

The most common story that we hear: something happens with ATM that makes it empty, leaving no forensic evidence. No money and no logs.
We have collected huge number of cases on how ATMs could be hacked during our researches, incidents responses and security assessments. A lot of malware infects ATM through the network or locally. There are black boxes, which connect to communications port of devices directly. There are also network attacks, such as rogue processing center or MiTM. 
How to stop the ATMs fraud? How to protect ATMs from attacks such as black box jackpotting? How to prevent network hijacking such as rogue processing center or MiTM? Some of these issues can be fixed by configuration means, some fixed by compensation measures, but many only by vendor. We will tell you about what bank can do now and what we as a community of security specialists should force to vendors. Before we spoke about vulnerabilities and fraud methods used by criminals. Now we would like to combine our expertise to help financial and security society with more direct advices how to implement security measures or approaches to make ATMs more secure.

Recently our team researched various ntos subsystem attack vectors, and one of the outputs we will present in our talk. DeathNote as our internal code name to this component, which resides in Microsoft Windows kernel, hiding behind different interfaces and exposed to user differently.

What can goes bad with it?

Basically two kinds of problems, one is syscall handling via direct user interaction. We will describe how to obtain basic understanding of what's going on, how it interacts with other components and what is its purpose. With those knowledge we will dig deeper how to make more complex fuzzing logic to cause enough chaos that will end up in unexpected behaviors in Windows kernel, and demonstrate some of them.
And as for second, as it hints from title, this module does bit of data parsing, so we will dive deep into internals, pointing out some available materials, and move on to reverse engineered structures and internal mechanism. We will show how some tricks can outcome with various results, and how structured approach can expose more problems than is expected.

One of the most prevalent methods used by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities is ROP - Return Oriented Programming. Many times during the exploitation process, code will run very differently than it does usually - calls will be made to the middle of functions, functions won’t return to their callers, etc. These anomalies in control flow could be detected if a log of all instructions executed by the processor were available.
In the past, tracing the execution of a processor incurred a significant slowdown, rendering such an anti-exploitation method impractical. However, recent Intel processors, such as Broadwell and Skylake, are now able to trace execution with low overhead, via a feature called Processor Trace. A similar feature called CoreSight  exists on new ARM processors.
The lecture will discuss an anti-exploitation system we built which scans files and detects control flow violations by using these new processor features.

The Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) was announced in 2013--a first-of-its-kind competition in which fully autonomous systems would compete in a Capture The Flag (CTF) tournament. Starting from over 100 teams consisting of some of the top security researchers and hackers in the world, only 7 teams qualified to the final round. These 7 teams competed against eachother to guard their own software with IDS rules and software patches while attacking the other systems. All of this was done without access to program source code nor access to humans.

This never-before-seen level of autonomy demonstrated the state of the art in areas of computer security including static analysis, automated bug finding, automatic exploit generation, and automatic software patching. Over the course of just 10 hours, these systems competed to analyze over 80 totally new pieces of software, showing capabilities beyond what anyone has ever seen before.

In this talk we will discuss the Cyber Grand Challenge, explaining what it entailed, what the results mean, and how these advances will influence software security in the near future. Additionally, we will share lessons learned from the winning CGC team, and take a look at the future of automatic software analysis.

Electron is a framework to create the desktop application on Windows,OS X, Linux easily, and it has been used to develop the popular applications such as Atom Editor, Visual Studio Code, and Slack.
Although Electron includes Chromium and node.js and allow the web application developers to be able to develop the desktop application with accustomed methods, it contains a lot of security problems such as it allows arbitrary code execution if even one DOM-based XSS exist in the application. In fact, a lot of vulnerabilities which is able to load arbitrary code in applications made with Electron have been detected and reported.
In this talk, I focus on organize and understand the security problems which tend to occur on development using Electron.

If any susceptible application data to a buffer overflow like a function pointer was on the memory block allocated by the target program, we can assume that Heap-based Buffer Overflow is as amenable to attacks as Stack-based Buffer Overflow. Although the remote attackers have no way to figure out whether it is really exploitable or not because the memory layout is conditional on a target application. Thus, an exploitation to Heap-based Buffer Overflow is not so practical. However it is so interesting and we focus on it.
One objective of attackers is gaining the program counter to lead to an arbitrary code execution and they usually realize that with "write-what-where primitive", an arbitary data write to anywhere, to the susceptible data. An ancient technique called "Unlink Attack" provides direct "write-what-where primitive" but it is not available today thus the recent exploit writers excogitate indirect "write-what-where primitive" by forcing malloc() to return a nearly-arbitrary address. There are several Heap Exploitation techniques like Malloc Maleficarum, a paper with some great techniques published by Phantasmal Phantasmagoria, which provides such indirect "write-what-where primitive". Some of them have been fixed but some others like House of Force and so on have been still available today.
This paper propose the "House of Einherjar", a new technique as an indirect "write-what-where primitive" on the latest GLIBC.

This talk will explore program analysis on compiled code, where source is not available. Many static program analysis tools, such as LLVM passes, depend on the ability to compile source to bytecode, and cannot operate on binaries. A solution to this problem will be explained and demonstrated using the new Intermediate Language (IL) in Binary Ninja. Binary Ninja IL will be described, providing a basic understanding of how to write analyses using it.

This talk will describe and release a tool in Binary Ninja IL for automated discovery of a simple memory corruption vulnerability and demonstrate it on a CTF binary. The concepts of variable analysis, abstract interpretation, and integer range analysis will be discussed in the context of vulnerability discovery.